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1. Introduction 
In a recent paper Dr~ze (1975) proposed an equilibrium concept 
for an exchange conomy where prices are not sufficiently flexible 
to achieve a Walrasian equilibrium. In such a case individual utility 
maximization guided only by price signals will not clear all markets. 
The concept of a quantity rationing process is introduced to impose 
additional restrictions on individual trades such that markets will 
clear. In this situation each individual receives price as well as 
quantity signals and maximizes his utility under these joint con- 
strainst. 
Two basic properties of the quantity rationing at equilibrium 
are imposed. First, the quantity constraints on net trades for each 
individual in each market are independent of his own actions and 
they determine only upper bounds for his net trades. In such a case 
an individual cannot manipulate these constraints in his favor by 
e. g. overstating his demand or supply, and he is never forced to 
trade since he can always propose less than the constraint, in 
particular zero. Second, the quantity constraints are effective on one 
side of each market only, i. e. if for some market some agent is 
rationed on the demand (supply) side, then no agent perceives con- 
straints on the supply (demand) side of this market, which are bind- 
ing for his equilibrium decision. 
It is well known, that the set of such equilibria for a given 
fixed price system is very large in general. If no other restrictions 
are imposed, like e. g. that not all markets can be rationed, there 
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always exists an equilibrium with zero trade, if all prices are positive. 
All this makes clear, that an equilibrium with quantity rationing 
may be very inefficient. On the other hand it is immediately apparent 
that, in general, global Pareto optimality cannot be achieved as 
long as prices are not Walrasian and income transfers are not al- 
lowed. The appropriate criterion in this case then has to be one of 
constrained Pareto optimality given that all agents trade at the given 
prices on their budget sets. Recently Youn~s (1975) indicated in a 
slightly different context hat in general an equilibrium with quan- 
tity rationing will not be a constrained Pareto optimum. The two 
examples in this paper give a general geometric illustration of this 
fact using an appropriately modified representation i the conven- 
tional Edgeworth box diagram. The examples also suggest, that 
constrained Pareto optimality may be obtained, if the rationing 
mechanism assures ome interdependence b tween markets. 
2. Definitions 
Let d~={I, (X~,co~, /~)} denote an exchange economy with a 
finite set of consumers I = {1,.. . ,  i , . . . ,  n}. There are I commodities 
indexed h=l , . . . , I .  Then with the usual interpretation R~ is the 
commodity space, X~ c R Z is consumer i's consumption set, ~o~  Rt+ 
denotes consumer i's initial endowment of commodities and ~> 
denotes his preference ordering on X~. i 
Given a fixed price vector p e R Z, p ~a0, consumer i is constrained 
to bundles x," e R z whose value does not exceed the value of his 
initial endowment. If he desires xt his net trade is defined as 
z~ =x~.-~o~. The rationing of each consumer i is described by a pair 
(_zr 2t) e R[  x R / where ~r h = 1, . . . ,  l represents the maximum 
quantity of commodity h which consumer i is allowed to sell and 
where ~h, h= 1, . . . ,  l represents the maximum quantity of com- 
modity h which he is allowed to purchase. Given prices p and the 
rationing constraints (~t, 2~), consumer i chooses a net trade z~ which 
maximizes his preference relation subject to his budget constraint 
and the rationing constraints. 
Let 
/9~ (p, _z~, ~) ={z~ ~ Rllp'z~ =0, z_t <_zt<_~r o)~+z~ ~ X~} 
denote the constrained budget correspondence of consumer i. His 
demand correspondence y~is then defined by 
)'t (p, z_t, ~)  = {z~ e fl~ (p, z_t, ~)  Icot + zl ,~ o)t + zt' for all 
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Definition 1 (according to Dr~ze  (1975)): An equilibrium with 
quantity rationing at prices p e R l, p r  is a list of net trades (z~), 
i=1 , . . . ,  n, and a list of constraints (_~,s162 i= l , . . . ,n  such that 
(1) Zz i=O 
i=1 
(2) zl ~ y~ (p, _z~, s for all i e I 
(3) for all h=l , . . . , l  
(i) zj~=~j ~ some ]e l  implies 2i~>z~  all i e l  
(ii) zjh=gj h some ] e I implies z~>_~ ~ all i e I 
Conditions (1) and (2) need no comment. Condition (3) reflects the 
fact that on each market h at most one side is effectively rationed. 
Definition 2: A list of net trades (z,), i=  1 , . . . ,  n, is a constrained 
Pareto optimum at prices p if 
(1) Z z,=O 
i=1  
(2) p'z~=O for all i e I  
(3) there exists no other list of net trades (zl'), i=1 , . . . ,  n, 
such that 
(i) z , '=0 
i=1  
(ii) p "z( = 0 for all i ~ I 
(iii) z( + 0)5 ~ zi + o~ for all i E I 
i 
with strict preference for at least one i E I. 
Without causing confusion of terminology any final allocation (x~), 
i=1 , . . . ,  n, associated with an equilibrium net trade (z~), where 
x~=z~+a~, will also be called an equilibrium with quantity con- 
straints. Similarly, if (zl), i=1 , . . . ,  n, is a constrained Pareto opti- 
mum, then (x~), i= l , . . . ,n ,  defined by x~=eo~+z~, will also be 
called a constrained Pareto optimum. The following two examples 
demonstrate that the two sets of allocations in general have an 
empty intersection. The first example indicates the general charac- 
teristics of the two sets. The second more specific example shows 
that a continuous change of the constraints may result in a con- 
tinuous increase in utility from the zero trade equilibrium to the 
best equilibrium which is, however, at a positive distance from the 
set of constrained Pareto optima. Furthermore it is shown that the 
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zero trade situation may be the only equilibrium if some prior 
restrictions are imposed on which markets hould be excluded from 
the rationing mechanism. 
3. Two Examples 
Consider an economy with two consumers i and j and three 
commodities b = 1, 2, 3. Let X~ =X;" =R3+ and assume that consumer 
i has nothing of the second commodity and consumer j has nothing 
of the first commodity, but both own positive amounts of the other 
two commodities initially. Then co~ = (col ~, 0, co8 I) and c~J = (0, ro2~, cod). 
Finally, preferences for both consumers are assumed to be strictly 
convex and monotonic. 
Given the vector of fixed prices p>>0, p.x=p,  co, x ~ R3+, defines 
the budget plane for each consumer and for any choice (xl, xz) of 
the first two commodities the quantity of the third commodity is 
uniquely defined. Therefore the allocation problem can be described 
completely by an analysis of a two dimensional Edgeworth box 
with some straightforward modifications. 
Consider consumer i. His consumption possibilities of the first 
two commodities restricted to his budget plane are given by the 
projection of his budget plane into the plane R 2 x {0} (see Fig. 1). 
The set of feasible (xl, x2)-consumption plans is described by the 
triangle 0 i A ~ Bq His unconstrained optimal consumption plan is 
the point (21 ~,~2 ~) which has been chosen to be on the line 
pl xl i + p2 x2 ~ = pl coil This implies that his unconstrained net trade 
on the third market is equal to zero. His demand on market two 
is equal to 2z i and his supply on market one is equal to col g -~ l  ~. 
His indifference curves in the triangle 0 ~ A ~ B e take the form of 
closed curves around the point (~1 r 22i). 
If consumer i is rationed on market one, then, for alternative 
values of the constraint between colg-~f ~ and zero one obtains his 
constrained offer curve S1 i. In Fig. 1 $1 ~ has been drawn to imply 
a simultaneous reduction of his demand of commodity two and of 
his supply of commodity three. Similarly, for alternative rationing 
levels on market two, one obtains his constrained offer curve D2L 
The no forced trade assumption implies that rationing on market 
three alone will not affect consumer i's optimal decision. On the 
other hand it can be seen easily from Fig. 1 that any rationing on 
more than one market will make him choose a best consumption 
plan between the two curves $1 ~ and D2 ~. 
Fig. 2 shows the same analysis for consumer j. There, however, 
it has been assumed that his unconstrained optimal consumption 
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plan involves a positive demand on market three. Consumer fs 
unconstrained supply on market wo is equal to ~ozJ-s and his 
demand on market one is equal to .~1 j. Rationing on market one 
" - ~ , .  ~ ~,x;+p, xA=r162 
"-4 Oi gl w/ W G 
Fig. 1 
only yields the constrained offer curve Dd. Similarly, for market 
two one obtains $2~ and for market hree Dd. Rationing on more 
J 
Fig. 2 
than one market simultaneously results in a decision which can be 
written as a convex combination of the endowment and some point 
on one of the three curves. 
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Fig. 3 gives the complete diagram. The zero consumption points 
of i and j are placed in the usual way. The joint endowment point 
is A. M ~ and MJ denote the unconstrained optimal consumption 
plans of i and j respectively. It is easily seen that El, E2, and E3 are 
the only equilibria which require rationing on two markets only. 
E1 is a pure supply constrained equilibrium with rationing on markets 
one and two. E2 represents an equilibrium with rationed supply 
on market one and rationed demand on market three. At E3 both 
consumers are rationed at a zero demand level on market three 
and consumer i is rationed on market two as well. At E0 consumer 





markets one and three. It is now easy to verify that the four line 
segments EoE1, El  E2, E2E3, and EsA constitute the set of equilibria 
with quantity rationing. On the other hand the set of constrained 
Pareto optima is the contract curve connecting M ~ with MJ which 
is disjoint from the set of equilibria. 
The purpose of the second example is to display some additional 
features of the relationship between the set of constrained Pareto 
optima and the set of equilibria. For the same economy it will be 
assumed that the preferences of both consumers are identical and 
representable by the utility function u (xl ,  x~, x~) = 2 x t  x2 + x2x3 + 
xsx l .  Endowments in this case will be o)~=(1, 5, 4) and r 4, 1). 
Equilibria Under Price Rigidities and Quantity Rationing 171 
Prices are all identical and equal to unity. Instead of the previous 
geometr ic  representat ion in a normal  Edgewor th  box we will use 
an equivalent one here in the space of net trades for commodi t ies  






The set of feasible net trades for  a consumer  is defined by 
Z = {z ~ Ral~ +z  > 0, zl +z2 +za =0}. 
El iminat ing z8 one obtains as the feasible sets in z l - z2 -space  for i 
and for j 
Zi  = {(zl, zz)lzl + 1 >0,  z-~ +5 > 0, 4-zl-z2>O) 
ZS = {(Zl, z~) IZl + 5 > 0, z2 + 4 >_ 0, 1 - zl - z~ -> 0} 
El iminat ing z3 as an argument  of the utility funct ion one obtains 
~t (zl, z~) = - (Zl - 4) 2 _ z2~ + c ~ 
~s (zl, z2) = -z l  2 -  (z2 + lj 2 +d,  
where c * and d are constants.  Fig. 4 gives the geometr ic  represen- 
172 V. B6hm and H. Miiller: 
tation in the zl-z2-plane with z ~ for consumer i and - z  s for con- 
sumer ]. Consumer i's unconstrained net trade consists of a demand 
of four units of commodity one against four units of commodity 
three offered for sale, so that M ~ is the point (4, 0). Consumer j
maximizes his utility at a positive demand of one unit of commodity 
two and a sale of one unit of commodity three. Hence his maximal 
point is -z J=(0,  -1).  The straight line joining M ~ with MJ is the 
set of constrained Pareto optima. 
There are two equilibria which involve rationing on two markets 
only. For consumer i, his demand constrained (net) offer curve with 
respect o rationing on market one coincides with the line segment 
[(0, 0), (4, 0)] since the indifference curves are concentric circles 
around M ~. For consumer j, the same argument shows that the 
segment [(0, 0), (0, -1)] is his demand constrained offer curve with 
respect o market one. The intersection of the two curves at the 
no trade position is an equilibrium where demand is rationed on 
market one and on market two at a zero level. The other equi- 
librium is obtained for a zero rationing of sales for both consumers 
on market three and a demand rationing level of 1/2 ]/2- on market 
one for consumer i. The zero rationing on market hree imposes on 
both consumers to trade along the straight line of slope minus one 
which passes through the origin. Therefore consumer i supplies 
1/2 V2 units of commodity two. Some straightforward arguments 
show that -(1/21/2_ -112 |/2-) is the optimal net trade for con- 
sumer ] if he is rationed at a zero level on market three. Finally, it 
is easy to verify that the whole line segment [(0, 0), (:/2 ],/2-, - 1/2 [/2-)] 
is the set of all equilibria with quantity rationing. However, all 
intermediate points involve rationing on all three markets. 
Again it is clear from Fig. 4 that the set of equilibria and the 
set of constrained Pareto optima are disjoint. The optimality pro- 
perties of the set of equilibria, however, are strongly dependent on 
which and on how many markets are to be rationed. If, for example, 
at least one market should not be rationed then, by determining 
this market a priori this may result in a zero trade situation as the 
only equilibrium. 
It is clear that successive increases of the rationing levels from zero 
to (1/2 ~"2, -1/2 1/2-) result in a continuous increase in utility for 
both consumers. However, further increases are not possible as is 
shown by the following arguments. 
Given any Pareto preferred points (zl, z2) with respect to 
(:/2 ]/2, - : /2  V2-), Fig. 5 shows that •1>1/2 ["2- and - z2>1/2  V2.. 
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However there exist t e (0, 1) such that consumer j prefers 
1 ( - z l ,  -z2) over ( - z l ,  -z2). Hence (zl, z2) cannot be substained 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  M,,. 
Fig. 5 
as an equilibrium. Therefore, a Pareto improvement requires some 
form of forced trading. 
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